Extradition from Georgia to Russia: defending against a Red Notice

A single border check can turn into a provisional arrest. That is the reality of the Georgia–Russia extradition corridor, and it is the reason timing and preparation matter far more than most people expect when they are weighing whether to relocate or travel through the region.

Extradition from Georgia to Russia is governed by a bilateral treaty, but the process does not operate in a legal vacuum. A Red Notice, or a diffusion circulated by Russia's NCB, typically runs alongside any formal extradition request. Each can be challenged independently. The grounds most likely to succeed – political character under Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution, human-rights deficiency under Article 2, and the dual-criminality requirement under Georgian extradition law – are real and well-recognised, but they must be argued on an evidenced file, not merely asserted.

As of mid-2025, we are seeing an increase in Russian-origin requests through this corridor. This page sets out how the process works, which defences carry genuine weight, and where honest practitioners acknowledge the limits.

How does extradition from Georgia to Russia actually work?

The procedural basis is the bilateral extradition treaty concluded between Georgia and Russia, supplemented by the Minsk Convention on legal assistance – the principal CIS multilateral instrument. Georgia's national extradition law provides the procedural rules that Georgian courts and the Ministry of Justice apply when a request arrives. In practice, the Russian side sends a formal extradition request through the Ministry of Justice channel, often after a Red Notice has already been circulated to locate the person.

The sequence matters. INTERPOL's Red Notice – a request to locate and provisionally detain with a view to extradition – is not an arrest warrant and carries no judicial authority. A Red Notice is not a judicial decision and does not establish guilt. Nevertheless, when it appears on a border system, it can trigger provisional detention under Georgian law pending receipt of the formal extradition papers. That window, before the full extradition hearing, is where the most urgent work takes place.

Georgian courts conduct a legality review. They examine whether the request meets the formal requirements of the treaty, whether dual criminality is satisfied, and whether there are mandatory refusal grounds. The public prosecutor's office and the courts share jurisdiction at different stages. The Ministry of Justice takes the final administrative decision, but it can only act within the boundaries set by the judicial review.

In our practice, the gap between provisional arrest and the first substantive hearing can be short. Anyone with exposure to this corridor should know in advance whether there is an active notice, what it alleges, and whether the underlying facts satisfy dual criminality under Georgian law.

What does the treaty actually require Russia to show?

Dual criminality is the threshold condition: the conduct alleged must be a criminal offence under both Russian and Georgian law. Russia has expanded its criminal code considerably over the past decade – particularly in the areas of fraud, tax, and what it classifies as extremism or discrediting state institutions. Not all of those provisions have Georgian equivalents.

Where there is no genuine Georgian equivalent, the extradition request should fail on dual criminality alone. Dual criminality is assessed on the facts alleged, not the name of the offence. A charge labelled "fraud" in Russia may be founded on conduct that Georgian law does not criminalise, or that falls below the threshold for extraditable offences. Practitioners before the Commission observe similar issues with Russian notices: the legal characterisation in the requesting state is sometimes chosen precisely because it sounds like a universal offence while the underlying conduct is political or commercial.

The treaty also sets a minimum sentence threshold. Extradition is available only for offences carrying a custodial sentence above a defined minimum in both states. Where the Russian charge carries a light sentence – or where the equivalent Georgian provision would not reach the threshold – the formal condition is not met.

There is also the question of what documentation the requesting state must provide. The treaty requires an adequate description of the facts, the applicable legal provisions, and evidence sufficient to support provisional detention. A poorly documented Russian request can be challenged at the threshold stage, before the merits are reached.

Are human-rights defences available in Georgian extradition proceedings?

Yes, and in our assessment they are the strongest single class of argument available in the Russia corridor. Georgia's constitution and its obligations under international human-rights instruments allow courts to refuse extradition where the person would face a real risk of torture, inhuman treatment, or a flagrantly unfair trial in the requesting state.

The argument is not abstract. It requires evidence: country-condition documentation, evidence of the pattern of prosecutions in the relevant category of case, and, where available, specific evidence about the individual's risk profile. Generalised assertions do not satisfy the standard. What works is a structured presentation showing why this particular person, in this particular category of case, faces a real risk that cannot be remediated by diplomatic assurances from the Russian side.

Article 2 of INTERPOL's Constitution requires respect for human rights in the spirit of the Universal Declaration. That provision is engaged at the CCF stage, not the Georgian court stage, but the two arguments run in parallel. An Article 2 challenge before the CCF supports – and is supported by – the human-rights defence before the Georgian court. The filing of a CCF request does not automatically stay extradition proceedings, but it creates a parallel record and can inform the court's assessment.

In an extradition matter in the South Caucasus region (autumn 2024), extradition was refused after the court accepted that the underlying prosecution was politically motivated and that the individual faced a real risk of treatment incompatible with human rights. The file included detailed country-condition evidence and a parallel CCF submission. That combination – court and Commission, argued together – is the approach we apply in this corridor.

How does the INTERPOL Red Notice fit into the defence strategy?

The Red Notice and the extradition request are legally distinct, but practically intertwined. Russia uses the Red Notice to locate the individual and trigger provisional arrest; the formal extradition request follows. Removing or suspending the notice does not automatically end the extradition proceedings, but it removes the international enforcement mechanism and can materially change the individual's practical position.

The CCF deletion process operates on a nine-month timetable from admissibility. Under the applicable rules, a deletion request is to be decided within nine months of being found admissible. That timeline does not pause extradition proceedings in Georgia. The two tracks must therefore be run in parallel, carefully sequenced, so that neither prejudices the other.

The grounds for CCF deletion in Russia-origin cases are well-established in our practice. Article 3 of INTERPOL's Constitution bars the processing of data connected to offences of a political, military, religious or racial character. Where the prosecution is rooted in business-dispute retaliation, political opposition, or the exercise of rights that are protected internationally, the Article 3 argument is available. Article 2 adds a human-rights overlay. The RPD's data-accuracy and data-quality requirements provide a further basis where the underlying information is factually defective or stale.

A diffusion – an alert circulated directly by Russia's NCB outside the formal Red Notice system – can also be challenged before the CCF and carries the same legal exposure at a border. In our experience, diffusions in this corridor are sometimes used when a formal notice might not survive scrutiny; they deserve equal attention.

The steps above are the general picture. Your situation turns on the specific allegations, the state of the Georgian proceedings, and the quality of the INTERPOL file – which is precisely what a confidential assessment examines.

For an honest view of whether there are grounds to act on the notice or the extradition request, contact us at info@northlarkfirm.com. The first assessment is confidential, and you can reach us through a secure channel.

What is the role of refugee or asylum status in Georgia?

Georgia has a domestic asylum system, and the principle of non-refoulement – the prohibition on returning a person to a country where they face persecution – is recognised under Georgian law and under the international instruments to which Georgia is party.

An active refugee or asylum status, or a pending asylum application, creates a significant procedural obstacle to extradition. Georgian law does not permit the extradition of a recognised refugee where the basis of the refugee claim is connected to the offences for which extradition is sought. This is a categorical bar, not a balancing exercise.

The relationship between asylum and extradition is not always simple. The requesting state's characterisation of the offence – and the timing of the asylum application – both matter. An application filed after arrest may be treated differently from one established before any proceedings were commenced. In our practice, the most defensible position is one where the protection claim is documented and formally filed before any extradition request is received, not as a reactive step once proceedings have begun.

Refugee status does not automatically cancel an INTERPOL Red Notice. The CCF will consider it as evidence of the political character of the underlying case, but an independent CCF submission is still required. The two tracks – protection in Georgia and deletion at INTERPOL – must both be pursued.

What mistakes are most common, and what should I avoid?

The most damaging mistake is engaging with the process too late. Provisional arrest can happen at any Georgian border crossing, at an airport, or on a transit through a third country. By the time a practitioner is instructed, the person is already in custody and the first-hearing window – the most critical moment for arguing release and opposing surrender – may be closing.

The second mistake is treating the CCF and the extradition proceedings as separate matters to be handled by separate lawyers who do not co-ordinate. Every submission to the CCF is visible, in principle, to the requesting state's NCB. An uncoordinated CCF file can inadvertently weaken the extradition defence, and vice versa. The two tracks must be run as a single integrated strategy.

The third mistake – and this is the one we see most often in cases that come to us after an initial failure – is a weak first CCF file. There is no appeal against a CCF decision. A fresh request requires new elements. Where a first file made unsubstantiated political-motive assertions without supporting evidence, or failed to address the data-accuracy requirements of the RPD, the path to a review is significantly harder. The quality of the initial submission is not a procedural formality; it determines the realistic prospects of the entire CCF track.

There is also a practical point about Georgia's domestic criminal law. If the Russian allegation has any overlap with conduct that Georgia itself might investigate, there is a risk of parallel proceedings. That risk must be assessed at the outset, not discovered after a submission has been filed.

If a first CCF request or an earlier defence produced a refusal, a second reading can identify what was missed and whether there are new elements – remembering there is no appeal, so a review must be built carefully from the ground up.

To understand the realistic prospects before you act, reach us through our secure channel (Signal, Telegram or WhatsApp) or write to info@northlarkfirm.com.

What are the realistic prospects for a successful defence?

Honest practitioners do not promise outcomes. What we can say, based on our experience in the Russia corridor, is that the defence prospects depend on three variables: the nature of the underlying allegation, the evidence available to support the challenge, and the state of the Georgian proceedings at the time of instruction.

Cases with the strongest prospects share certain features. The underlying prosecution is rooted in business, political or property disputes rather than ordinary criminal conduct. There is documentary evidence of the dispute's background. The allegations do not satisfy dual criminality under Georgian law, or do so only on an expansive reading. Country-condition evidence supports the human-rights argument. And the CCF file is built on specific, evidenced grounds rather than general assertions.

Cases with weaker prospects – or where we would decline to act – are those where the underlying conduct appears to be genuinely criminal under both systems, where there is no credible political-motive argument, and where the person is seeking a procedural delay rather than a lawful defence. We act only on lawful mandates. We do not help anyone evade legitimate justice, and we take on a matter only where we see genuine grounds.

In a recent matter (a CIS-origin notice pursued through the extradition channel, spring 2025), we secured the withdrawal of the INTERPOL element and a suspension of the extradition proceedings after demonstrating that the underlying prosecution was connected to a commercial dispute and that the allegations failed dual criminality under the law of the requested state. The result was not guaranteed at the outset; it was the product of a well-evidenced file assembled at pace.

What the person facing this corridor most needs is an honest assessment of where they actually stand – not reassurance, and not a list of theoretical arguments. That is what an early confidential assessment provides.

Related

• Extradition from Georgia – the full picture of Georgian extradition law and procedure
• Red Notice requested by Russia – how Russian-origin notices are challenged at the CCF
• Article 2 human-rights ground – the human-rights basis for CCF deletion in depth

Frequently asked questions

Can I be released or bailed during proceedings?

Release during Georgian extradition proceedings is possible but not automatic. The court assesses flight risk and the strength of the extradition request. In our practice, a well-prepared bail application – supported by ties to Georgia, the absence of a genuine flight risk, and arguable grounds against the underlying request – can succeed at the provisional-detention stage. The first hearing is the critical moment; preparation before arrest is far more effective than reactive instruction after it.

Does dual criminality apply to my case?

Dual criminality applies as a standard condition in Georgian extradition law. The conduct alleged must constitute a criminal offence under both Russian and Georgian law. Dual criminality is assessed on the underlying facts, not the label the requesting state places on the charge. Where the Russian allegation rests on provisions with no genuine Georgian equivalent – for example, broadly defined fraud, or offences linked to political activity – the dual-criminality requirement may not be met, and the request should fail at that threshold.

What is the rule of specialty and does it help me?

The rule of specialty requires that, if extradited, a person may only be prosecuted for the offences specified in the extradition request. They cannot be tried for other offences committed before surrender without the consent of the extraditing state. In practice, the rule matters where Russia is known to use a limited charge as an entry point, intending to expand the prosecution after surrender. The specialty argument is best raised at the extradition hearing stage, as part of the overall resistance to surrender.

About NORTHLARK

NORTHLARK is an independent international boutique acting exclusively in INTERPOL Red Notice and diffusion challenges before the CCF, and in related extradition proceedings. We are fully independent – there is no association with any CIS or Russian firm, network or affiliate, and that independence is a deliberate protective feature for clients whose notices originate from Russia or the CIS region. We work with allied counsel in the relevant jurisdiction for all in-country procedural steps.

We act only on lawful mandates. We do not help anyone evade legitimate justice, and we take on a matter only where we see genuine grounds.

The first assessment is confidential. Our enquiry form does not require your real name, and you can reach us through a secure channel – Signal, Telegram or WhatsApp. To discuss the Georgia–Russia corridor specifically, write to info@northlarkfirm.com.